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POINT I
THE RECORD SUPPORTS CLEAR AND
CONVINCING EVIDENCE OF FRAUD
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execute a piomistfoi > nnlfe

in a principal sum which was $22,386 in excess of its existing
liability (R. 194-195).
It should further be noted, that the Affidavit of Jerry
Floor identified Thomas Lloyd as the individual who made the
fraudulent statement (Floor Affidavit, J 8, R. 192). In this
regard, Thomas Lloyd filed three separate affidavits in this
case (R. 53, 285, 502).

Two of the three affidavits were

filed after the filing of the Affidavit of Jerry Floor. At no
time in any of the three affidavits did Thomas Lloyd deny
making

the

submitted

fraudulent
that

statements.

uncontroverted

It

is

evidence

is

respectfully
"clear

and

convincing."
The uncontroverted statement that the subject premises
were vacant with no prospect for a replacement tenant coupled
with a written lease agreement which clearly demonstrated that
such statement was false together with Gump & Ayers' execution
of a promissory note which was $22,386 in excess of its
existing liability, considered together, would permit a jury
to find the existence of fraud by clear and convincing
evidence.
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POINT II
THERE IS NO FACTUAL OR LEGAL SUPPORT
FOR UNION PARK'S ARGUMENT THAT THE
FRAUD WAS IMMATERIAL
In its brief, Union Park argues that its fraud is
immaterial inasmuch as the fruits of the fraud produced only
$22,386.1s1 in excess of accrued rents.
In an apparent attempt to persuade the Court to accept
the proposition that fraud is permissible when it succeeds in
inducing the payment of "small amounts," Union Park argues
that its fraud should be excused by reason of the fact that
damages would have been $487,775.76 if the Promissory Note had
not been signed.

On this basis, Union Park claims that its

fraudulent statements were "immaterial."
Assuming Union Park's argument is worthy of serious
consideration, it should be noted that the calculation of
"damages" of $487,775.76 is based upon a series of unsupported
factual and legal conclusions. All components of the claimed
"damage" have no factual and/or legal support and demand the
scrutiny of discovery and cross examination.
The focus of Union Park's argument on the materiality of
the fraud consists of a series of unsupported factual and
legal conclusions purporting to claim "damages" that were
Union Park claims that the amount in excess of accrued liability was $13,133,04.
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caused by a series of events that were not directly caused by
Gump & Ayers1 termination of the Lease.

Some of the events

clearly resulted in economic benefits to Union Park. However,
Union Park has ignored the economic benefits in an attempt to
create the appearance of substantial damages.
Union Park asserts that it relet less than all of the
premises previously occupied by Gump & Ayers (R. 35, 60);
Union Park claims that Matrix vacated other space in order to
occupy the subject premises (R. 35, 60); Union Park claims
that it was "forced" to relet the subject premises at a
reduced rental rate (R. 35, 60); and, Union Park asserts that
it was "forced" to expend $18,559 for capital improvements to
the subject premises (R. 36, 60). Each of these claims will
be separately addressed.
Union Park claims that the Matrix Lease involved only a
portion of the subject premises formally occupied by Gump &
Ayers (Union Park's brief, p. 11, J 15).

However, the Gump &

Ayers* Lease of June 1, 1983 (R. 66) involved only 4,497
square feet and the Gump & Ayers1 Lease of June 28, 1985 (R.
84) involved only 912 square feet, a total space of 5,409
square feet on the second floor.

In this regard, the Court

should note that the Matrix Lease of November 23, 1988 (R.

4

135) included 10,039 square feet on the second floor.2 Thus,
the replacement lease permitted Union Park to lease 4,630
square feet of previously unoccupied space.3 This substantial
economic benefit is totally ignored by Union Park in its
argument in an attempt to create the appearance of a loss.
Union Park further claims that when Matrix leased the
subject premises it vacated other premises in the building
(Union Park's brief, p. 11, fl 16). Without citation to any
authority, and without any details as to the alleged vacant
space, Union

Park

included

the rents

for

the premises

previously occupied by Matrix in its calculation of "damages"
on the materiality issue.

Gump & Ayers is unaware of any

legal authority holding a tenant liable for lease payments on
an unrelated lease arrangement that was terminated by the
landlord and the replacement tenant.
The self-serving claim that Union Park was "forced" to
relet the premises at a lower rental rate is based on the
unsupported conclusion of its general partner, Thomas Lloyd
(R. 35, 60). By reason of the fact Union Park and Matrix had

Prior to executing the Lease for 10,039 square feet, Matrix had previously occupied only 5,351
square feet (R. 113).
According to Union Park, none of the 10,039 square feet of space under the new Lease included
space previously occupied by Matrix under it old lease (R. 35,60).
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a common managing agent/ Gump & Ayers attempted to discover
the facts supporting the conclusory statement that the reduced
rent was "forced" rather than the result of a voluntary
concession

to

Union

Park's

affiliate

or

involving

consideration or benefits other than rent payments.

Union

Park's answers to the discovery asserted additional conclusory
and self-serving statements

(see Union Park's Answers to

Interrogatories Nos. 3 and 4, attached to Gump & Ayers1
original brief as Addendum Exhibit "G").
The self-serving claim that Union Park was "forced" to
expend

$18,559 for capital improvements is based on the

conclusory statement of its general partner, Thomas Lloyd (R.
35, 60). By reason of the fact that Union Park and Matrix had
a common managing agent (see f n. 4), Gump & Ayers attempted to
discover the facts supporting the conclusion that the capital
improvements were "forced" rather than a voluntary concession
to Union

Park's affiliate or involving consideration or

benefits other than rent payments. Union Park responded with
additional self-serving conclusory statements (see Union Park
Answers to Interrogatory Nos. 3 and 4, attached to Gump &
Ayers' original brief as Addendum Exhibit "G"). In an attempt
4
J. Robert Bonnermort was one of two general partners of Union Park and was also an officer of
Matrix (r. 207-212), Union Park acknowledged Bonnermort's dual affiliation with Matrix and Union Park (Lloyd
Affidavit, K 10, R. 293-294).
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to create the appearance of damage, Union Park includes the
entire expenditure in its "damage" calculation ignoring the
enhanced value of the premises at the expiration of the Matrix
Lease.
The many factual issues inherent in the materiality issue
are apparent.

In this regard, as noted in Gump & Ayers1

original brief, materiality is a factual guestion which should
be determined by a jury.

Christopher v. Larson Ford Sales,

Inc., 557 P.2d 1009 (Utah 1976); Berkeley Bank v. Meibos, 607
P.2d 789 (Utah 1984); Lewis v. White, 269 P.2d 865 (Utah
1954).
POINT III
ALL OF THE ELEMENTS OF
FRAUD ARE ESTABLISHED
Union Park erroneously asserts that in alleging the
defense of

fraud

in the inducement, Gump

& Ayers must

establish all of the elements of an affirmative fraud claim.
It appears Union Park contends that each element of fraud
must be expressly stated in an affidavit. However, the law is
clear that the elements can be established by facts and
inferences from facts.

Frederick May & Company v. Dunn, 368

P.2d 266 (Utah 1962); Durham v. Maraetts, 571 P.2d 1332 (Utah
1977).

In this regard, Gump & Ayers need not submit a sworn

statement that Union Park knew its statement regarding vacancy
7

of the subject premises was false.

On the contrary, such

knowledge may be inferred from the fact that at the time of
the statement, Union Park had executed a lease with Matrix
describing the subject premises.
The Affidavit of Jerry Floor (R. 189) together with the
written lease of the subject premises to Matrix, bearing a
date prior to the execution of the Promissory Note, establish
all of the elements of a fraud claim. It follows with greater
force that such evidence establishes the defense of fraud.
A representation was made concerning a presently existing
material fact (R. 191-192), which the declarant knew to be
false (R. 135), for the purpose of inducing the other party to
act (R. 191-192) and Gump & Ayers acted in ignorance of the
falsity

of the statement

(R. 194) and relied

upon the

statement in executing the Promissory Note to its injury
(R. 194-195). Accordingly, all of the elements of fraud have
been established.
POINT IV
GUMP & AYERS1 MOTION TO AMEND
WAS SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD
BEFORE THE LOWER COURT
In an attempt to justify the lower court's denial of Gump
& Ayers1 Motion to Amend, Union Park asserts that the Motion
to

Amend

"was

unsupported

by
8

either

affidavits

or

a

memorandum."

Such argument is contrary to the record before

the Court.
The Motion

to Amend was filed on March

21, 1991,

(R. 235). At the same time, Gump & Ayers filed the Affidavit
of Jerry Floor (R. 189).

Paragraphs 12 and 18 of Jerry

Floor's Affidavit expressly noted the facts supporting Gump &
Ayers' Motion to Amend (R. 193-194, 195-196). At the time the
Motion to Amend was filed, Gump & Ayers also filed its
Memorandum

of

Points

and

Authorities

in

Opposition

to

Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 213). Paragraphs
45 and 46 of the Memorandum expressly address the grounds upon
which

the

Motion

to

Amend

was

based

(R.

222-223).

Furthermore, although not required by Rule 15, Gump & Ayers'
attached copies of the proposed Amended Answer (R. 238) and a
copy of the proposed Counterclaim (R. 243). Thus, contrary to
Union Park's argument, all of the grounds supporting the
Motion

to

Amend

were

presented

to

the

lower

court

simultaneously with the Motion.
POINT V
GUMP & AYERS1 MOTION TO
AMEND WAS TIMELY FILED
In a further attempt to justify the lower court's denial
of Gump & Ayers' Motion to Amend, Union Park asserts, without

9

citation of authority, that Gump & Ayers1 "delay" in filing
the Motion to Amend was "not excusable."5
Union Park asserts that Gump & Ayers should have asserted
fraud at an earlier point in time despite the absence of any
investigation to establish the defense as required by Rule 11.
Union Park further asserts a vague suggestion that Rule 15 has
a time limit.

Not a single authority is cited in support of

either argument.
Gump

&

Ayers

respectfully

submits

that

in

the

circumstances of this case, there was no undue delay in filing
the Motion to Amend.

Moreover, in light of the reservation

noted in Gump & Ayers1 original answer6, Union Park was fully
advised as to Gump & Ayers1 position in the matter and was not
prejudiced by the "delay."
Furthermore, in its ruling, the lower court expressly
stated that her denial of the Motion to Amend was not based
upon any finding that the Motion was untimely (R. 442-443).

The only legal authority cited by Union Park on the issue was West ley v. Farmer's Insurance
Exchange, 663 P.2d 93 (Utah 1983). The West ley case holds that the timeliness of a motion to amend is
determined in the discretion of the trial court. As noted in the text of this brief, the lower court in this
case held that the Motion to Amend was not untimely (R. 442-443). Furthermore, the West ley case involved a
motion to amend that had been delayed an entire year and, if granted, would have delayed the scheduled trial.
Such circumstances clearly distinguish the West ley case from the instant case.
The third defense of Gump & Ayers' initial Answers stated:
Defendant reserves the right to conduct discovery to
determine if the Promissory Note was procured by fraud. In
the event discovery produces evidence of fraud, Defendant
reserves the right to amend this Answer to assert fraud in
the inducement.
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POINT VI
THE ARGUMENT THAT THE LOWER COURT
CONSIDERED THE EVIDENCE AS THOUGH
THE MOTION TO AMEND HAD BEEN
GRANTED IS SPECULATIVE
Union

Park

argues

that the

lower

court gave

full

consideration to the facts relating to fraud despite the fact
that the Motion to Amend, which asserted fraud, was denied by
the lower court. In light of the lower court's denial of the
Motion to Amend, the argument that the denial of the Motion to
Amend had no impact on consideration of fraud evidence is
speculative.
Admittedly, there is some language in the lower court's
ruling (R. 436-448) that supports the claim that the fraud
evidence was considered. However, there is also language that
suggests that the ruling on the Motion to Amend had some
impact on the lower court's consideration of the fraud
evidence:
MR. MCDONALD: The problem I have, if the
Motion to Amend is not granted, then
fraud isn't before the court on summary
j udgment.
MR. SWAN:
It is in the way of the
affirmative defense on how to defend a
motion.
THE COURT: Well, you defended on that
basis and I considered it in that
context.
It was a pending motion I
reserved on that. I indicated I had read
11

all the pleadings about it. Motion to
Amend is denied.
(Ruling, R. 443).
(Emphasis added).
Gump & Ayers respectfully submits that in reviewing the
ruling of the lower court, it must be presumed that the lower
court followed the general law which precludes consideration
of evidence of fraud in the absence of a pleading asserting
such defense. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12(h).

In

such a circumstance, Gump & Ayers respectfully submits that
the denial of its Motion to Amend to assert the defense of
fraud must be presumed to have had material impact on the
lower courtfs consideration of the fraud evidence and that the
failure

to

fully

consider

such

evidence

under

the

circumstances of this case constituted an abuse of discretion.
POINT VII
THE PROMISSORY NOTE PROVIDES A SPECIFIC
TIME PERIOD FOR THE FLAT RATE INTEREST
With respect to Union Park• s argument on the interest
rate issue, the provisions of Utah Code Annotated § 15-1-3 do
not mandate a per annum rate. The statute applies only when
"no period of time is stated . . . ."
The Promissory Note in the instant case specifies the
time period to which the ten percent (10%) flat rate was to be
applied. In this regard, the Promissory Note expressly states
"this Note shall bear interest at the rate of ten percent
12

(10%) from and after May 1, 1988" (R. 8). The Promissory Note
further

establishes

installments

and,

that

there

excluding

were

those

to

months

be
in

18 monthly
which

no

installment was due, the last installment was to be made on
October 1, 1991,7 a period of 30 months.

This results in a

total interest of $5,500 or $183.33 per month during the
thirty-month period of the Note.
Gump & Ayers concedes that after the period of interest
specified in the Promissory Note, the interest would accrue at
the statutory rate specified in Utah Code Annotate § 15-1-1.
The case of Jackson v. Fennimore, 230 Pac. 689 (Okla.
1924), provides no support for Union Park's argument.

The

Jackson case involved different statutory wording and the
issue was not properly raised by the pleadings in that case.
CONCLUSION
The summary judgments entered by the lower court in favor
of Union Park should be reversed for the reasons stated in
Gump & Ayers1 original brief and supplemented in this reply
brief.
The Order denying the summary judgment filed by Gump &
Ayers should be reversed for the reasons stated in Gump &

The Promissory Note provided for six installments payments each calendar year from May to
October making the final installment due on October 1, 1991.

13

Ayers1 original brief and supplemented in this reply brief.
DATED this *h0

day of June, 1993.
1TCD0NALD, WEST & BENSON

\ Jr
By
M. McDonald
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Utah Code Annotate § 15-1-1

(Supplement)

COURI Of M < V E A L S
Utah Code Annotated § 15-1-3

TITLE 15
CONTRACTS AND OBLIGATIONS
IN GENERAL
Chapter
1. Interest.
2. Legal Capacity of Children.
3. Interparty Agreements.
4. Joint Obligations.
5. Revolving Charge Agreements [Repealed].
6. Prompt Payment Act.
7. Registered Public Obligations Act.

CHAPTER 1
INTEREST
Section
15-1-1.

Interest rates — Contracted rate —
Legal rate.
15-1-2, 15-l-2a. Repealed.

Section
15-1-3. Calculated by the year.
15-1-4. Interest on judgments.
15-1-5 to 15-1-10. Repealed.

15-1-1. Interest rates — Contracted rate — Legal rate.
(1) The parties to a lawful contract may agree upon any rate of interest for
the loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or chose in action that is the
subject of their contract.
(2) Unless parties to a lawful contract specify a different rate of interest,
the legal rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or
chose in action shall be 10% per annum.
(3) Nothing in this section may be construed in any way to affect any
penalty or interest charge that by law applies to delinquent or other taxes or
to any contract or obligations made before May 14, 1981.
History: L. 1907, ch. 46, § 1; C.L. 1907,
§ 1241; C.L. 1917, § 3320; R.S. 1933, 44-0-1;
L. 1935, ch. 42, § 1; C. 1943, 44-0-1; L. 1981,
ch. 73, § 1; 1985, ch. 159, § 6; 1989, ch. 79,
§ !•
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amendment. effective April 24, 1989, redesignated
r
°J?e/><iUh>Se .I™ T a f Subsection (1) and

ffi^ sits fSSSTt^

and second sentences of former Subsection (1)

as Subsections (2) and (3); and made stylistic
changes.
Cross-References. — Payment of interest
as extending statute of limitations, § 78-12-44.
Rate where unspecified in instrument,
§ 70A-3-118
T i m e a t w n i c h i n t e r e s t c o m m e n c e s running,
.118, 70A-3-122.
§ §utah
7 0 A . 3c
c d Code § 70C 1 101 et
se<
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TITLE 15
CONTRACTS AND OBLIGATIONS
IN GENERAL
Chapter
1. Interest.
8. Utah Rental Purchase Agreement Act.

CHAPTER 1
INTEREST
Section
15-1-4.

Interest on judgments.

15-1-1. Interest rates — Contracted rate — Legal rate,
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in Nielsen v. O'Reilly, 200 Utah Adv.
Rep. 8 (1992).

15-1-4- Interest on judgments.
(1) Any judgment rendered on a lawful contract shall conform to the contract and shall bear the interest agreed upon by the parties, which shall be
specified in the judgment.
(2) Other judgments shall bear interest at the federal postjudgment interest rate as of January 1 of each year, plus 2%.
(3) "Federal postjudgment interest rate" means the interest rate established for the federal court system under 28 U.S.C Sec. 1961, as amended.
History: L. 1907, ch. 46, § 11; C.L. 1907,
§ 1241x9; C.L. 1917, § 3330; R.S. 1933 & C.
1943, 44-0-1; L. 1981, ch. 73, § 2; 1993, ch.
198, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1993 amendment, effective May 3, 1993, divided and desig-

nated the existing language as Subsections (1)
and (2) and made related changes, substituted
"to the contract" for "thereto" in Subsection (1),
rewrote Subsection (2), which read "Other
judgments shall bear interest at the rate of
12% per annum," and added Subsection (3).

142

INTEREST
instances where interest accrues as a matter of
law but no specific rate has been agreed to; it
does not create a right to interest where none
otherwise exists. Vali Convalescent & Care
Insts. v. Division of Health Care Fin., 797 P.2d
438 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).

15-1-3

Unconscionability.
Where one loaning money had received the
full amount of money loaned and interest
amounting to 15% per annum, the debt was
held fully paid, and the lender could not recover anything in addition. Carter v. West, 38
Utah 381, 113 P. 1025 (1910).

School districts.
School district, where it has received the
benefit of goods, should pay the legal rate of
interest from the date it received the benefit of
its contract. Baker Lumber Co. v. A.A. Clark
Co., 53 Utah 336, 178 P. 764 (1919).

Cited in Ringwood v. Foreign Auto Works,
Inc., 786 P.2d 1350 (Utah Ct. App. 1990);
Sprouse v. Jager, 806 P.2d 219 (Utah Ct. App.
1991).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Brigham Young Law Review. — Usury
Implications Of Alternative Mortgage Instruments: The Uncertainty In Calculating Permissible Returns, 1986 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1105.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 45 Am. Jur. 2d Interest and
Usury § 63 et seq.
C.J.S. — 47 C.J.S. Interest § 32.
A.L.R. — Construction and effect of disclosure statutes requiring one extending credit or
making loan to giwe statement showing terms
as to amounts involved and charges made, 14
A.L.R.3d 330.

15-1-2, 15-l-2a.

Validity and construction of provision (escalator clause) in land contract or mortgage that
rate of interest payable shall increase if legal
rate is raised, 60 A.L.R.3d 473.
Compensation for interest prepayment penalty in eminent domain proceedings, 84
A.L.R.3d 946.
Prejudgment interest awards in divorce
cases, 62 A.L.R.4th 156.

Repealed.

Repeals. — Sections 15-1-2 and 15-l-2a (L.
1907, ch. 46, § 2; C.L. 1907, $ 1241x; C.L.
1917, § 3321; R.S. 1933, 44-0-2; L. 1935, ch. 42,
§ 1; C. 1943, 44-0-2; L. 1953. ch. 24, §§ 1, 2;

1955, ch. 20, § 1; 1965, ch. 25, § 1), relating to
maximum interest rates on loans and conditional sales contracts, were repealed by Laws
1969, ch. 18, § 9.103.

15-1-3. Calculated by the year.
Whenever in any statute or deed, or written or verbal contract, or in any
public or private instrument whatever, any certain rate of interest is mentioned and no period of time is stated, interest shall be calculated at the rate
mentioned by the year.
History: L. 1907, ch. 46, § 7; C.L. 1907,
§ 1241x5; C.L. 1917, § 3326; R.S. 1933 & C.
1943, 44-0-3.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 47 C.J.S. Interest § 42.
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